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Introduction 
Wang, Rendon, Champion, Ellen, and Walk (hereafter Wang et al., 2016) 
identify the incentive problem that is characterized as a “moral hazard” in the 
Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) current use of the Truth in Negotiation Act (TINA). 
One of the examples they concentrated on was the ineffective use of TINA in the 
context of firm-fixed-price (FFP) contracts. Specifically, a contractor under an FFP 
contract that is subject to TINA has the following negative incentive: The fear of 
being held accountable for any significant unfavorable cost discrepancy (i.e., the 
actual incurred cost is significantly below the ex-ante cost estimate negotiated with 
the DoD as the basis for contract fixed-price) would strongly motivate the contractor 
to shirk (i.e., reduce cost-saving effort) or even engage in cost padding (e.g., by 
opportunistically incurring or allocating more costs to the government contracts). 
Such behavior leads to deadweight welfare loss that is ultimately borne by 
taxpayers. 
This study extends Wang et al. (2016) to a broader scope and greater depth. 
In particular, we propose to customize the use (or disuse) of TINA in the DoD for 
various contracting scenarios involving specific acquisition category (ACAT I through 
III), stage of the cycle (Milestones A, B, and C), and contract type. The bottom line is 
we don’t believe the TINA policy should be prescribed via a one-size-fits-all 
approach; rather, the use or disuse of TINA should be customized to various 
situations. 
We continue to employ an economics-based, incentive-centric approach that 
focuses on investigation of agents’ (i.e., DoD contractors’) incentives under various 
settings. Then we generate our policy recommendation through a “with” and 
“without” TINA comparison. 
TINA is a federal acquisition regulation, which goes beyond the DoD and the 
DoN. We expect that significant cost savings can be generated for the DoD and the 
DoN, as well as other federal government agencies, by providing such a framework 
described above. 
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The remainder of the report is organized as follows. The next section 
describes the DoD acquisition process. Following that is a section that describes 
how TINA is implemented in DoD acquisition via a one-size-fits-all approach. 
Building on those two sections, the following one (Customizing the Use [or Disuse] 
of TINA in the DoD Acquisition Process) tailors the use or disuse of TINA (i.e., TINA 
waiver) to various circumstances. We offer a conclusion in the final section. 
DoD Acquisition Process: Category, Cycle, and Contract Type 
The DoD procures goods and services through contracts. Schwartz (2014) 
interprets “acquisition” as “a broad term that applies to more than just the purchase 
of an item or service.” Rather, “the acquisition encompasses the design, 
engineering, construction, testing, deployment, sustainment, and disposal of 
weapons or related items purchased from a contractor” (Page 1). 
DoD acquisition is governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
along with the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). 
Additional regulations such as TINA also apply.  
Acquisition Category (ACAT) 
Depending on program costs, DoD acquisition is divided into three categories. 
The biggest ticket purchase is Category I (ACAT I), also called Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) defines MDAPs as programs with more 
than $480 million (fiscal year 2014 dollars) in research, development, test, and 
evaluation (RDT&E) expenditures; or at least $2.79 billion (fiscal year 2014 dollars) 
in procurement funding; or as designated as a major defense acquisition program by 
the milestone decision authority (10 U.S.C. § 2430, Major Defense Acquisition 
Program Defined). A similar Category I definition, namely ACAT IA, also called Major 
Automated Information System (MAIS), with different dollar thresholds, exists for 
DoD acquisition of Automated Information System (AIS).  
The next procurement tier is Category II, which is a major system defined as 
10 U.S.C. 2302d (Reference (h)), yet which does not meet criteria for ACAT I or IA. 
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Finally, Category III (ACAT III) includes any program that does not meet criteria for 
ACAT II or above or any AIS program that is not a MAIS. 
Table 1, reproduced from DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02, Operation of the 
Defense Acquisition System (USD[AT&L], 2013), details the definitions of each 
acquisition category. 
It is worth noting that as the acquisition category decreases from I to III, so 
does the level of oversight from the DoD and Congress. One should expect that the 
closest scrutiny and most supervision is being applied to MDAPs. Another difference 
between ACAT I (MDAPs) and non-MDAPs is the degree of information asymmetry 
between the DoD and the contractor. MDAPs are inherently more technologically 
complex than ACAT II and III programs and hence information asymmetry is more 
serious to start with for MDAPs. 
A GAO (2015) report indicates that the 
DoD requested $168 billion in fiscal year 2014 to develop, test, and 
acquire weapon systems and other products and equipment. About 40 
percent of that total is for major defense acquisition programs or ACAT 
I programs. DoD also invests in other, non-major ACAT II and III 
programs that are generally less costly at the individual program level. 
These programs typically have fewer reporting requirements and are 
overseen at lower organizational levels than ACAT I programs, 
although they may have annual funding needs that are just as 
significant. – Page 1. 
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Acquisition Cycle 
Schwartz (2014) identifies a  
three-step process of identifying the required weapon system, establishing a 
budget, and acquiring the system. These three steps are organized as 
follows: 
1. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System—for 
identifying requirements. 
2. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System—for 
allocating resources and budgeting. 
3. The Defense Acquisition System—for developing and/or buying the 
item. 
These three steps (each of which is a system onto itself), taken together, are 
often referred to as “Big ‘A’” acquisition, in contrast to the Defense Acquisition 
System, which is referred to as “little ‘a’” acquisition. 
Figure 1, reproduced from Schwartz (2014), depicts the three-step process. 
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The cycle of the defense acquisition process contains three stages, namely, 
pre-acquisition, acquisition, and sustainment, with critical reviews identified by 
milestones A, B, and C. Figure 2, reproduced from Schwartz (2014), describes the 
acquisition cycles. 
 
As illustrated by Figure 2, each milestone needs to be passed in order to 
reach the next stage. In particular, three key phases (Technology Maturation and 
Risk Reduction, Engineering and Manufacturing Development, and Production and 
Deployment) immediately follow the passage of Milestones A, B, and C, 
respectively. 
Schwartz (2014) points out, 
The official responsible for deciding whether a program meets the 
milestone criteria and proceeds to the next phase of the acquisition 
process is referred to as the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). 
Depending on the program, the MDA can be the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics), the head of the relevant 
DOD component, or the component acquisition executive. –Page 7 
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Contract Type 
The contract types are broadly classified into two categories: fixed-price 
contracts and cost-plus contracts. One can imagine a spectrum with the firm-fixed-
price (FFP) contract on one end, under which the contractor assumes all the risks 
and has the highest incentive to save cost. At the opposite end of the spectrum is 
the cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract,1 where the government pays the contractor 
its realized cost and sets a fixed fee (profit). The fixed fee is supposed to be 
independent of actual cost, although its level is implicitly related to the size of the 
project.2 Under CPFF, the government bears all the cost risk and hence leaves the 
contractor little incentive to minimize cost. Between the two extremes, FFP and 
CPFF, are the various forms of incentive contracts including fixed-price-incentive-fee 
(FPIF) contracts, cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) contracts, and cost-plus-award-fee 
(CPAF) contracts. The following descriptions of each contract type are based on the 
FAR, except for the “budget-based-cost-plus” scheme, which is not defined by the 
FAR and has no application thus far in the DoD. 
Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) Contracts 
A firm-fixed-price contract provides a price that is not subject to any 
adjustment based on the contractor’s actual costs in performing the contract. This 
contract type places maximum risk and full responsibility for all costs and resulting 
profit or loss on the contractor. It provides maximum incentive for the contractor to 
control costs and perform effectively and imposes a minimum administrative burden 
upon the contracting parties.  
  
                                                          
1 The CPFF contract is the benchmark case for cost-plus contract. A “cost-plus” contract without indicating whether it is 
“cost-plus-fixed-fee” or “cost-plus-incentive-fee” or “cost-plus-award-fee” would refer to a CPFF contract. However, 
throughout this paper, we reserve the use of “cost-plus” contract as a general category including all variations of cost-plus 
contracts.  
2 The cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contract type, which was used sometimes in the U.S. DoD acquisition practice before 
the 1960s, is prohibited by FAR 16.102. This particular type cost-plus contract rewards rather than penalizes a firm’s cost 
inefficiency. 
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Fixed-Price-Incentive-Fee (FPIF) Contracts 
A fixed-price incentive-fee contract is a fixed-price contract that provides for 
adjusting profit and establishes the final contract price by a formula based on the 
relationship of the final negotiated total cost to the total target cost. A fixed-price 
incentive contract specifies a target cost, a target profit, a price ceiling (but not a 
profit ceiling or floor), and a profit adjustment formula. These elements are all 
negotiated at the outset. The price ceiling is the maximum that may be paid to the 
contractor, except for any adjustment under other contract clauses. When the 
contractor completes performance, the parties negotiate the final cost and the final 
price is established by applying the formula. When the final cost is less than the 
target cost, application of the formula results in a final profit greater than the target 
profit. Conversely, when the final cost is more than the target cost, application of the 
formula results in a final profit that is less than the target profit, or possibly a net loss. 
If the final negotiated cost exceeds the price ceiling, the contractor absorbs the 
difference as a loss. Because the profit varies inversely with the cost, this contract 
type provides a positive, calculable profit incentive for the contractor to control costs. 
Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) Contracts 
A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that pays the 
contractor a negotiated fee that is fixed at the inception of the contract. The fixed fee 
does not vary with actual cost, but may be adjusted as a result of changes in the 
work to be performed under the contract. This contract type permits contracting for 
efforts that might otherwise present too great a risk to contractors, but it provides the 
contractor only a minimum incentive to control costs. 
Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF) Contracts 
A cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that 
provides an initially negotiated fee to be adjusted later by a formula based on the 
relationship of total allowable costs to total target costs. This contract type specifies 
a target cost, a target fee, minimum and maximum fees, and a fee adjustment 
formula. After contract performance, the fee payable to the contractor is determined 
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in accordance with the formula. The formula provides, within limits, for increases in 
the fee above the target fee when the total allowable costs are less than the target 
costs, and decreases in the fee below the target fee when the total allowable costs 
exceed the target costs. This increase or decrease is intended to provide an 
incentive for the contractor to manage the contract efficiently. When the total 
allowable cost is greater than (or less than) the range of costs within which the fee-
adjustment formula operates, the contractor is paid total allowable costs, plus the 
minimum (or maximum) fee. 
Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) Contracts 
A cost-plus-award-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that includes 
a fee consisting of (a) a base amount (which may be zero) fixed at inception of the 
contract, and (b) an award amount, based upon an evaluation by the government, 
sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in contract performance. Since the 
award fee determination is made unilaterally by the government, this contract type is 
only appropriate when achievement is measurable by subjective evaluation rather 
than objective data, which is unlikely to be true under significant information 
asymmetry.  
Budget-Based-Cost-Plus-Scheme (BBCPS) Contracts 
A budget-based-cost-plus-scheme contract is a refinement of CPIF in the 
following sense: Under BBCPS, the job of estimating the target cost is shifted from 
the government to the contractor and both the target fee and the cost share 
coefficient vary with the estimated target cost rather than being constants under 
CPIF. A carefully designed BBCPS contract will desirably induce the contractor’s 
“truth-telling” behavior and hence effectively mitigates the agency problem and 
reduces information asymmetry.  
BBCPS belongs to the larger topic of “menu of contracts” discussed in the 
principal-agent literature. This body of literature has broad applications in executive 
compensation contracts, regulation, and government procurement contracts (Laffont 
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& Tirole, 1986, 1993; McAfee & McMillan, 1987; Melumad & Reichelstein, 1989; 
Reichelstein, 1992). 
Selecting a contract type along with a price requires sound judgment. The 
contracting officer also has to consider the implication of contracting method. For 
example, FAR 16.102 (a) states that “contracts resulting from sealed bidding shall 
be firm-fixed-price contracts or fixed-price contracts with economic price 
adjustment.” Most often a decision on contract type and price is a negotiation 
process that hopefully will lead to fair risk sharing and a price that motivates the 
contractor to minimize cost and deliver quality product.  
The Use of TINA in DoD Acquisition 
a. TINA Defined 
TINA was first enacted in 1962 and has been amended many times since 
then. Wang et al. (2016) states,  
In a nutshell, TINA requires contractors (often sole-source) to submit “cost 
or pricing data” when they negotiate the price of a contract with the federal 
government. The contractors must certify that the information they provide 
is “current, complete, and accurate.” Failing to disclose truthful information 
could lead to civil or criminal investigation. The intention of TINA is to 
protect the government and taxpayers from being ripped off by better 
informed contractors. 
b. TINA Applicability 
TINA applies to a wide range of procurements that include both fixed-price 
and cost-plus contracts. Any negotiated prime contracts or prime contract 
modifications that exceed $750,000 are subject to TINA. In a similar fashion, 
certified cost or pricing data is required for any negotiated subcontracts or 
subcontract modifications greater than $750,000. 
c.  “Cost or Pricing Data” Defined 
TINA defines “cost or pricing data” as “all facts that, as of the date of price 
agreement, or, if applicable, an earlier date agreed upon by the parties that is as 
close as practicable to the date of price agreement, prudent buyers and sellers 
would reasonably expect to affect price negotiations significantly.” 
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In general, pure judgments are not deemed to be “facts” and hence are not 
cost or pricing data. However, Calhoon and Sybert (2012) point out, 
Cost or pricing data includes more than just historical accounting data; they 
are all the “facts” reasonably relevant to evaluate estimates of future costs 
and to the validity of costs already incurred. This may include, but is not 
limited to: 
1) Vendor quotes; 
2) Nonrecurring costs; 
3) Information on changes in production methods and in production or 
purchasing volume; 
4) Data supporting projections of business prospects and objectives 
and related operations costs; 
5) Unit-cost trends such as yield rates and labor efficiency; 
6) Make-or-buy decisions; 
7) Estimated resources to attain business goals; and 
8) Some information on significant management decisions. (Calhoon & 
Sybert, 2012, p. 13) 
Although some of the above information is hard facts, estimates and 
projections also can be used as “cost or pricing” data. It is worth noting that for most 
major weapon programs where technology is unbelievably complex, a big 
component of cost estimate is based on faithful estimates and educated projections. 
d. TINA Exemptions 
According to Calhoon and Sybert (2012), TINA can be exempted if one or 
more following situations applies: 
1) Adequate Price Competition 
2) Prices Set by Law or Regulation 
3) Commercial Items 
4) Pricing Actions Less Than $750,000 
5) Exceptional Cases—Waiver by Head of Contracting Activity (p. 7) 
Note that TINA waivers are rarely given, consequently, TINA governs most 
major DoD contracts. 
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e. TINA: A One-Size-Fits-All Approach 
From what is described above, one can see that TINA is a one-size-fits-all 
approach. TINA is essentially a blanket application with very limited exception. In 
particular, TINA application does not (at least not directly) vary with acquisition 
category, cycle, and contract type. Intuitively, this approach does not make sense. In 
a subsequent chapter, we detail our arguments against the one-size-fits-all approach 
and accordingly propose to tailor the use of TINA to various combinations of 
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Customizing the Use (or Disuse) of TINA in the DoD Acquisition Process 
In this section, we continue our investigation of the role of TINA in the context 
of DoD procurement. The objective is to provide a guideline for the use or disuse of 
TINA for various combinations of acquisition category, cycle, and contract type.  
We employ an economics-based, incentive-centric approach that focuses on 
investigation of agents’ (i.e., DoD contractors’) incentives under various settings. We 
generate our policy recommendation through a “with” and “without” TINA 
comparison. 
Two key decisions need to be made to answer our research question. 
Namely, what is the right contract type for each combination of category and cycle, 
and further, given the selected optimal contract type, shall we impose or waive the 
TINA?  




Table 2 illustrates the task graphically. On the vertical dimension, as 
acquisition category descends from I to III, so does the information asymmetry 
between the government and the contractor. On the horizontal dimension, as the life 
cycle matures, the technological uncertainty gets resolved progressively and the 
cost vagueness runs down. 
According to the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) provided by Defense 
Acquisition University, various contracts ranging from CPFF to FFP represent 













MDAP      
ACAT II      
ACAT III      
















Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 14 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
contractor). Figure 3, reproduced from the DAG, illustrates the risk to different 
contract types: 
 
Figure 3: Risk to Contract Types 
 
Moreover, the DAG also provides guidelines for typical contract types that are 
used at different stages of acquisition life cycle. Figure 4 is replicated from DAG. 
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Figure 4: Typical Contract Types by Acquisition Phase 
Applying the DAG framework to our Table 2 setting, which has one more 
dimension (acquisition category), we propose the following use of contract types, as 
in Table 3, for each cell of Table 2. 
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As the acquisition category descends from I to III, within the same life cycle 
stage (with the exception of the first and last stage), we gradually shift toward the 
contract type that allocates more risk to the contractor, taking away the risk from the 
DoD. This incentivizes better effort on the contractors’ part. 
Table 3: Proposed Contract Types for Table 2 
 
Now our task is to suggest either the use or disuse of TINA for each of the 
cells above. Our recommendations are tabulated in Table 4 and followed by detailed 
explanations. 












MDAP FFP CPFF CPIF FPIF FFP 
ACAT II FFP CPIF CPAF FPIF/FFP FFP 
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Detailed Discussions/Justifications for Table 4: 
(1) The most notable part of this table is that it proposes a deviation from the 
current practice of TINA, which is essentially a one-size-fits-all prescription. 
Namely, we recommend varying the use or disuse of TINA with respect to 
acquisition category, acquisition life cycle stage, and the corresponding 
preferred contract type.  
(2) For the red-colored cells, that is, ACAT I (MDAP) starting from Pre-Milestone 
C and continuing through the rest of the acquisition cycle, we propose to do 
away with the use of TINA. The polar case here, that is, the use of FFP in the 
context of MDAP, is thoroughly analyzed by Wang et al. (2016), where the 
authors identify the incentive problem that is characterized as a “moral 
hazard,” that is, a lack of effort from the contractor. Specifically, a contractor 
under an FFP contract that is subject to TINA, has the following negative 
incentive: The fear of being held accountable for any significant unfavorable 
cost discrepancy (i.e., the actual incurred cost is significantly below the ex-
ante cost estimate negotiated with the DoD as the basis for contract fixed-
price) would strongly motivate the contractor to shirk (i.e., reduce cost-saving 
effort) or even engage in cost padding (e.g., by opportunistically incurring or 
allocating more costs to the government contracts). Such behavior leads to 
deadweight welfare loss that is ultimately borne by taxpayers. 
As shrewdly pointed out by Rogerson (1994) “TINA cannot force defense 
contractors to reveal the lowest possible cost that they could produce at if 
they exerted an optimal effort. Rather, it essentially tells them that the price 
they negotiate must be close to the cost they actually incur” (Page 80). 
It is worth noting that for ACAT I (MDAP), even at the very late stage of the 
acquisition cycle, due to the extreme complex technology and production 
process, significant information asymmetry nevertheless exists between the 
contractor and the DoD. Consequently, the unverifiable part of the production 
cost is still significant and there is plenty of room for contractors to shirk or 
engage in cost padding. Hence, it is very essential to realize the unintended 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 18 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
negative consequence of enforcing TINA in this particular setting, and a lax 
use or even disuse of TINA is preferred here to induce the contractors to 
reveal their best-effort cost. 
The other two red-colored cells, that is, MDAP at Pre-Milestone C 
(Engineering and Manufacturing Development), and Post-Milestone C 
(Production and Deployment), adopt CPIF and FPIF, respectively. Both CPIF 
and FPIF belong to incentive contracts which are designed to encourage 
cost-saving efforts from contractors. To the extent that TINA exposes a 
compliance risk to contractors in case of ex-post unfavorable cost variance, 
imposing TINA in these two cells would have similar unintended consequence 
as discussed in Wang et al. (2016), hence we recommend a similar fix, that 
is, the disuse of TINA. 
(3) For the yellow-colored cells, we suggest no changes to the current TINA 
use. These cells include the following:  
a) ACAT III across all the life cycle stages 
That is, no additional TINA waiver3 is recommended for ACAT III. The 
primary reason for keeping TINA in place for ACAT III is the modesty 
of information asymmetry between the DoD and the contractor. 
Therefore, the verifiability of the program cost is good. When most of 
the cost information is verifiable, TINA is an effective mechanism to 
deter defective pricing. 
b) ACAT II life cycle stages up to Pre-Milestone C 
Under this category, CPIF and CPAF are prescribed for Pre-Milestone 
B and Pre-Milestone C, respectively. In general, cost-plus contracts 
inherently suffer from a moral hazard problem. Removing TINA does 
not make the problem go away. However, TINA does reduce the 
“defective pricing” incentive by imposing the litigation risk, at least for 
                                                          
3 Current applicable TINA waiver still applies, for example, if classified as commercial items. 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 19 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
the verifiable part of the program cost. So the net benefit of “with TINA” 
minus “without TINA” is positive and we suggest a “stay-put” strategy. 
For the cell that intersects ACAT II and Pre-Milestone A (Material 
Solution Analysis), the prescribed contract type is FFP, yet we suggest 
the use of TINA. This is in contrast to what we suggest for the polar 
case discussed in ACAT I. The major reason is that for Pre-Milestone 
A, which is a pre-system acquisition stage, most of the conceptual 
refinement work is performed through analogy or parametric estimating 
methods. To the extent that the estimation is based on similar existing 
items or mathematical models, a big part of the cost is verifiable. As 
argued before, TINA is an effective way of deterring “defective pricing” 
when the cost information is verifiable. 
c) ACAT I (MDAP) life cycle stages before Pre-Milestone B 
We propose to keep TINA in place for the FFP contract used in Pre-
Milestone A MDAP for the same reasons mentioned in the previous 
example. For the cell that intersects MDAP and Pre-Milestone B, TINA 
is also retained to mitigate the incentive of engaging in “defective 
pricing.”  
(4) For the purple-colored cells, we recommend the flexible use of TINA. Use 
or disuse of TINA should be dependent upon individual cases. On one 
hand, ACAT II, even at the last two stages of life cycle, should still 
demonstrate non-trivial information asymmetry between the DoD and the 
contractor; therefore, our worry about the contractor’s negative incentive 
under TINA and the related “moral hazard” problem remains. On the other 
hand, to the extent that ACAT II is much smaller and less complex than 
ACAT I (MDAP), the degree of information asymmetry should be much 
less severe than under MDAP. If the major part of the program cost is 
verifiable, then enforcing TINA can effectively prevent “defective pricing” 
from happening. Decision makers must examine the two offsetting factors 
and accordingly choose the use or disuse of TINA to maximize social 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 20 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
welfare. For example, one can argue that if Technology Readiness Level 
(TRL) reaches 8 or above, then the use of TINA is preferred.  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 21 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Conclusion 
TINA, as it currently stands, is a one-size-fits-all prescription. Specifically, 
TINA does not differentiate among various settings involving different acquisition 
categories, acquisition life cycle, and corresponding preferred contract type. We 
propose to tailor the use or disuse of TINA to different scenarios by considering the 
economic incentives created by TINA enforcement. In some settings where TINA is 
misplaced, we propose to drop TINA to remove the negative incentives and the 
unintended negative consequences. In other settings where TINA brings more 
benefit than cost, we recommend keeping TINA in place. In a few settings where the 
judgment is not unambiguous, we propose to leave the discretion to decision 
makers. 
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